On May 7, India launched 'Operation Sindoor,' a precision missile strike campaign targeting terror infrastructure across Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Punjab Province. The operation focused on nine key locations, including Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) headquarters, Markaz Taiba, in Muridke, nearly 50 kilometres from Lahore, and Jaish-e-Mohammed's (JeM) Subhan Allah Mosque complex in Bahawalpur. Both sites are known hubs for training, radicalisation, recruitment, and weapons storage by these anti-India outfits. Emerging reports suggest the use of BrahMos air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the operation.
"Over the last three decades, Pakistan has systematically built a terror infrastructure - a complex web of recruitment and indoctrination centres, training areas for both initial and refresher courses, and launch pads for handlers," Wing Commander Vyomika Singh stated following the strike, which lasted from 1:05 to 1:30 am on the night of May 7. While military skirmishes in the India-Pakistan conflict have often centred around Kashmir, the targeting of the Punjab Province marked the first instance since 1971 that military action was undertaken in Pakistan's largest province.
Punjab As A Recruitment Heartland
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which operate in the peripheral provinces of Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, often dominate headlines in Pakistan due to their current operational tempo. However, they have also served as a distraction from the long-standing architecture of support that continues to benefit anti-India groups like LeT, JeM, and Hizbul Mujahideen.
Historically, Punjab has been the heartland for the recruitment and radicalisation of anti-India militants operating in Kashmir. JeM chief Masood Azhar, a UN-designated terrorist, also publicly addressed followers at the Bahawalpur mosque in December 2024, invoking historical grievances while reinforcing the ideological and operational significance of these sites in sustaining anti-India militancy. In reported statements by Azhar following the Indian strike, 10 of his family members and four close associates were killed in the attack; however, there is no official confirmation regarding the death of Abdul Rauf Azhar, Masood Azhar's brother and JeM's military chief. India's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) stated that the Markaz Taiba in Muridke served as the training ground for Ajmal Kasab, the only terrorist held alive during the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Reports of financial donations from al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden for the compound's establishment in 2000 also emerged. Collectively, these revelations are likely to resonate deeply with the Indian public, reinforcing support for the retaliatory strikes and shaping the national narrative on counterterrorism. Separately, Kasab was known to be from Faridkot village in Pakistan's Punjab, signalling a history of recruitment from the state.
Institutional Memory of Pakistan's Proxy War
Pakistan's terror ecosystem did not emerge in isolation. It was bred during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Saudi Arabia funnelling support through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). After 1989, Pakistan redirected these assets toward its border with India. The insurgency in Kashmir during the 1990s offered a new theatre. Over the years, LeT and JeM evolved into sophisticated military-social hybrid outfits, freely operating training camps, arms depots, and relief organisations, with ideological affiliations to the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith schools of thought.
By the early 2000s, this terror infrastructure had matured into state-led mechanisms of Pakistani intelligence, particularly targeting India and Afghanistan. Years of dossiers and declassified intelligence from several countries indicate that these groups received safe havens, military-level training, and logistical assistance. Despite designations by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), crackdowns on their real estate holdings, banking channels, and recruitment operations were rarely sustained or effective.
Same Strategy, Different Tactics
Pakistan's removal from the FATF grey list in 2022 was interpreted by some segments as a sign of compliance. Nonetheless, this progress failed to keep track of the underlying tactical choreography, where key terror figures were briefly imprisoned, linked charity wings of outfits were renamed, and financial trails were obfuscated, not severed. Ultimately, the state did enough to secure international relief without structurally breaking down the architecture to support militant proxies.
Shifts in recent years have been more nuanced. The military's operational focus has increasingly turned inward, especially following the proliferation of TTP-led attacks in Pakistan following the takeover of Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021. The spike in anti-state violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan forced Pakistan to rethink the traditional dichotomy of "good" and "bad" Taliban. While Pakistan has long been a victim of terrorism itself, it has done little to break ties from India-centric proxies. As such, India is currently witnessing a reshuffling of priorities not a recalibration of Pakistan's military-jihadi complex.
Kashmir: A Muted But Active Theatre
Notwithstanding the unprecedented attack on tourists in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, militancy in the Kashmir Valley has remained relatively dormant in recent years. However, this does not equate to peace. The insurgency has attempted to morph into a localised movement, characterised by lone-wolf operations, targeted killings, and online propaganda, as opposed to large-scale operations. This leaves room for Pakistan to evade overt military escalations while maintaining plausible deniability.
Interrogation records, recovery of arms and Pakistan-made materials, and digital forensic trails in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) have consistently linked these new modules to handlers in Pakistan. Crucially, entities like The Resistance Front (TRF) and People's Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) are alleged to be new fronts for old actors, rebranded to infuse confusion and amplify the narrative of indigenous dissent.
The use of such proxies is rooted in the logic of asymmetric warfare, where weaker states offset conventional disadvantages by employing non-state actors, plausible deniability, and escalation-control tactics. When confronted by a resourcefully superior adversary, these states often resort to proxies to pursue revisionist goals, increasing the costs of deterrence.
Why Proxies Are Used
India and Pakistan have never been military equals - a gap that has only widened across GDP, defence spending, diplomatic clout, and global partnerships. For Pakistan's security establishment, this imbalance has necessitated alternative strategies to project parity. Proxies are often used for strategic advantages, distributions, and employing conflicts beneath the radar of international scrutiny. This phenomenon is not exclusive to India and Pakistan. A similar global pattern is evident in the Iran-Israel conflict. Confronted with the military superiority of Israel and its US allies in the Middle East, Iran has cultivated non-state proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria to project power and maintain regional influence.
This approach aligns with former Pakistan Army chief Zia-ul-Haq's doctrine of "bleeding India through a thousand cuts", a strategy allegedly mimicked by the country's current army chief, Asim Munir. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine has further shielded it, limiting the scope of conventional action by India. This was evident after the Kargil War of 1999, the Indian Parliament attack in 2001, and post the Mumbai attacks in 2008, when India, despite public outrage, refrained from launching full-scale hostilities.
However, under the current administration, India's military operations, such as the Balakot strike in 2019 and aerial strikes in major cities like Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad, point to a shifting red line.
(The author is Research Analyst, Pakistan Desk, Takshashila Institution)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
